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Kasbar: Aliens: Reaffirming the Territorial Distinction as the Means of D

CASE COMMENT
ALIENS: REAFFIRMING THE TERRITORIAL DISTINCTION AS
THE MEANS OF DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)

John F. Kasbar"*"
The Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered two resident aliens
deported due to their criminal records.' The Attorney General detained the
aliens beyond the removal period under the authority granted by statute.2
The aliens filed for separate writs of habeas corpus challenging their
continued detention as a violation of due process.' The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted one petition,4

* This Comment is dedicated to all of my family and friends, especially Margaret Ann
Johnson. I would also like to thank everyone at the FloridaLaw Review and Craig Hammer for
their help.
** Editor'sNote: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam award for the best
Case Comment written during Spring 2002.
1. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001). One of the aliens had been convicted of
drug related charges, theft, attempted robbery, and attempted burglary. Id. This alien also had a
history of flight from both criminal and deportation proceedings. Id. The other alien the Court
considered was involved in a gang-related shooting and convicted of manslaughter. Id. at 685.
2. The federal statute reads in pertinent part:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible,... removable [as a result of
violating nonimmigrant status or condition of entry, committing a criminal
offense, or posing a national security or foreign relations threat] or who has been
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period
and, if released, shall be subject to.

.

. supervision....

8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(6) (2000). The removal period is the ninety-day period authorized for removal
of aliens from the United States. Davis, 533 U.S. at 686. The aliens were detained beyond the
removal period because no other country would accept them. Id. at 684, 686. Furthermore, one of
the aliens was considered to be dangerous to the community, while the other alien was considered
to be both a flight risk and dangerous to the community. See id at 684-85.
3. One alien claimed the post-removal-period detention was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and international law. Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1999), vacatedsub nom. Davis,533 U.S. at 678. The other
alien also challenged his continued detention as a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Kim Ho Mav. Reno, 208 F.3d 815,818 (9th Cir. 2000), vacatedsubnom. Davis,
533 U.S. at 678.
4. Zadvydasv. Caplinger, 986F. Supp. 1011,1027 (E.D. La. 1997), rev'd, Underdown, 185
F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacatedsub non. Davis, 533 U.S. at 678. The district court determined
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but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding the post-removal-period detention constitutional.' The United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted the
other petition,6 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed The Supreme Court granted certiorari8 and, in order to
avoid a serious threat to the Constitution,9 HELD, that the post-removalperiod detention is no longer authorized by the statute once the ability to
remove the alien is no longer reasonably foreseeable.' °
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the United
States to "'deprive' any 'person... of... liberty ...without due process
of law.""'.. Johnson v. Eisentrager2 illustrates, however, that the Due
that the INS would never find another country to accept the alien and that the possible consequence
was permanent detention. Id. It therefore held that the post-removal-period detention violated the
alien's constitutional rights to substantive due process. Id.
5. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 285. Contrary to the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that there was a possibility that the INS would find a country to accept the alien.
Id. at 294. It held that the detention is permissible when the alien poses a flight risk or is a danger
to the community so long as there are good faith efforts made to effectuate deportation and there
are reasonable parole and periodic review procedures in place. Id. at 297. In reaching its decision,
the court found that resident aliens are not entitled to greater substantive due process than
excludable aliens asserting the same right when the governmental interests to expel them are the
same. Id. at 295-96.
6. Phan v. Reno, 56F. Supp. 2d 1149,1 156-57(W.D. Wash. 1999), aff'd on othergrounds,
Ma, 208 F.3d 815, vacatedsub nom. Davis, 533 U.S. at 678. The district court used five lead cases
out of 100 petitions for habeas corpus that were pending in the Western District of Washington to
establish a framework to guide decisions on each of the 100 petitions. Id at 1151. With respect to
substantive due process, the court held that in order to determine a violation, the dangerousness and
flight risk of an alien must be balanced against the likelihood that the government will be able to
effectuate the alien's deportation. Id. at 1156. Therefore, to detain an alien indefinitely when
deportation will never occur would be excessive since detention is only lawful in the process of
deportation. Id. With respect to procedural due process, the court held that each petitioner was
entitled to an individualized assessment before an immigration judge and would be permitted to
appeal any denial of a release to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id. at 1157.
7. Ma, 208 F.3d at 822. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that when an
alien has already entered the United States and there is no reasonable likelihood that another
country will accept him in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Attorney General must release the
alien under supervision called for by the statute after the removal period. Id. By limiting the
detention permitted by the statute, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit avoided deciding
whether the post-removal-period detention violates due process. Id. at 822 n.14.
8. Davis, 533 U.S. at 698. The Supreme Court granted certiorari based on statutory and
constitutional questions. Id.
9.
at 699.
10. Id.The instant Court presumed that a six-month detention period was sufficient to effect
the removal of an alien. Id. at 701. It state however, that this presumption could be overcome if
it were shown that there was a likelihood that the alien could be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Id.
11. Id. at 690 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V.).
12. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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Process Clause does not afford all persons, aliens in particular, the same
amount of protection. 3 In Johnson, twenty-one German nationals
continued military activity against the United States after Germany's
surrender in World War 11.14 They were subsequently convicted of
violating the laws of war by a United States military commission and
imprisoned. 5 The German nationals filed for a writ of habeas corpus
claiming their6 trial, conviction, and imprisonment violated the Fifth
Amendment.'
The Court stated that once an alien's presence in the United States is
permitted, he is afforded rights since his presence implies American
protection. 7 The Court also emphasized that an alien's rights increase as
his identification with American society increases.' Since the German
nationals were not present in the United States and were engaged in
military action against the United States, the phrase "any person" in the
FifthAmendment did not apply to them.' 9 Thus, the Court held that the
German nationals had no right to a writ of habeas corpus.20
In Shaughnessy v. United States,2 ' the Court applied the territorial
distinction in Johnson, but with a more harsh result.22 Respondent in
Shaughnessy was an alien who had lived in the United States for twentyfive years.' In a failed attempt to visit his dying mother in Rumania,24 he
remained in Hungary for nineteen months due to his inability to secure an
exit permit.25 After receiving an immigration visa from the American
Consul, he traveled to New York where the Attorney General, without a
hearing, ordered him excluded on security grounds.26 Respondent

13. See id.at 769.
14. Id. at 765-66.

15. Id. at 766.
16. Id. at 767.
17. See id at 777-78. The Court stated that access to our courts has been granted to aliens
because by permitting their presence in the United States, their protection is implied regardless of
whether they are friendly to our country. Ida The Court also noted that important constitutional
guaranties to an alien's person and property have been extended to resident aliens by virtue of their
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id at 770-71.
18. Id. at 770. The Court stated that the lawful presence of an alien in the country gives him
certain rights that become increasingly secure and extensive when he declares his intention to
become a citizen. Id. Upon naturalization, the alien's rights are equal to those of a full citizen. Id.
19. See id. at 782.
20. Id. at 785.
21. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
22. See id at 214.
23. Id. at 208.
24. Id. Respondent was denied entry to Rumania. Id
25. Id.
26. Id. The Attorney General refused to disclose information regarding the Respondent's
exclusion on the grounds that the information was confidential and its disclosure would prejudice

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

remained in detention
on Ellis Island because no other country was willing
27
to accept him.
The Court denied Respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.28
The Court stated that an alien seeking initial entry is afforded lesser due
process protection than an alien the United States attempts to remove.29
Relying on a territorial distinction,3" the Court held that, for constitutional
purposes, Respondent was "assimilated to [the] status"' of an entrant
alien.2 With respect to Respondent's identification with American society,
the Court noted that during Respondent's nineteen-month absence from
the United States he spent time in a communist part of Europe.33 The Court
did not, however, discuss the relevance of Respondent's twenty-five years
of inhabitance in the United States.34
In contrast to the Johnson Court, the Court in Landon v. Plasencia35
placed greater emphasis on an alien's ties to the community than on a
territorial distinction.36 In Landon, Respondent was a permanent resident
alien.37 Respondent had married a United States citizen and lived in the
United States for five years.38 During a two-day visit to Mexico,
Respondent met with Mexican and Salvadorian nationals and agreed "to
assist their illegal entry into the United States."3" Upon Respondent's
return, she was detained at the port of entry to the United States and, after
an exclusion hearing, was ordered excluded and deported.40 Respondent
filed for a writ of habeas corpus to release her from the exclusion and
deportation order.4
the public. Id
27. Id. at 209.
28. Id. at 214-16.
29. Id. at 212 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 (1953); United States
ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33,49-50 (1950); Yamatayav. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 660 (1892)).
30. Id. at 213. The Court determined that neither Respondent's detention on Ellis Island nor
his prior residence prevented him from being defined as an entrant. Id. The Court noted that
Respondent's presence on Ellis Island was authorized by Congress in order to avoid the hardship
of detention aboard a ship at sea. Id. at 215.
31. Id. at 214 (quoting Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 599).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
36. See id. at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 23-25.
41. Id. at 25. Respondent challenged her exclusion on several grounds. Id. at 32. First, that
she was entitled to a deportation hearing as opposed to an exclusion hearing. Id. The former of
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Despite the fact that Respondent was not in a territory of the United
States when detained, the Court held that she was entitled to due process
protection.42 The Court stated that a resident alien retains constitutional
rights upon return from a brief absence,43 but noted that if a resident alien's
absence is extended, the resident alien may lose these rights.' The Court
found that Respondent's trip interrupted her residence in the United States
when she violated immigration law by attempting to smuggle illegal aliens
into the United States.4" As a result, Respondent was entitled to less due
process protection than a continuously present resident alien.46 The alien's
presence outside of the United States in itself was not dispositive.47
Instead, the Landon Court examined the absence in conjunction with
Respondent's actions during her absence to determine the strength of her
ties to the United States.4" An alien has no constitutional rights with
respect to his application for initial admission to the United States.49
Respondent's ties, however, to the United States were strong enough to
entitle her to some due process protection.5
In the instant case, the Court did not analyze the aliens' ties to the
United States to determine the degree of due process protection that they
should be afforded.5" Instead, the instant Court relied on a strict territorial
distinction to decide that the post-removal-period detention posed a serious
constitutional threat. 2 Applying Shaughnessytothe instant case, the Court

these hearings allows an alien greater due process rights. Id. at 25-26. Respondent also claimed that
she was denied due process at her exclusion hearing. Id. at 32.
42. Id. at 32.
43. Id. at 33 (citing Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)).
44. Id. (citing KwongHaiChew, 344 U.S. at 596). The Court does not offer guidance on what
time frame would constitute a brief period. See id CompareKwongHai Chew, 344 U.S. at 594-96
(finding that a five month absence does not result in the loss of an alien's due process rights), with
Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953) (finding that a nineteen month absence
does result in the loss of an alien's due process rights).
45. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 30-32. QuotingRosenberg,374 U.S. at 462, the Courtstated that
if a resident alien takes a brief, innocent, and casual excursion outside of the United States, he is
not treated as an entrant alien. Landon, 459 U.S. at 29. When, however, an alien's purpose in
leaving the United States is to accomplish a goal that is against our immigration policy, his
residential status is meaningfully interrupted. Id. As a result, the alien is treated as an entrant for
constitutional purposes. See id.
46. Id. at 30-32.
47. See id. at 32.
48. See id. at 29 (citing Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 462).
49. Id. at 32 (citing United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892)).
50. See id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).
51. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-99 (2001).
52. Id at 693 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 213, 215 (1953)). In
determining the existence of a serious constitutional problem, the instant Court also noted that the
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distinguished the status of the alien in Shaughnessyfrom the aliens in the
instant case on the grounds that the latter had gained entry into the United
States. 3 The instant Court noted that the Constitution gives certain
protection to aliens inside the country that are not available to aliens
outside the United States' borders. 4 Furthermore, it emphasized that the
Due Process Clause applies to all aliens who enter the United States,
regardless of the legality or permanence of their presence. Thus, while
the instant Court's holding was one of statutory construction, the reasoning
for the construction was constitutional. 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist andjoined in part by Justices Scalia and Thomas, acknowledged
that the aliens in the instant case are situated differently from an alien who
has never gained entry." Justice Kennedy argued, however, that even if the
aliens in the instant case have greater rights than an alien who has never
gained entry, the fact that the aliens in the instant case are removable
means that they have no legal right to remain in the United States. 8 He
reasoned that the rights afforded to an alien are a function of the alien's
ties to the community and compliance with our laws." Justice Kennedy
concluded that, in light of the risk of flight and danger to the community
posed by the aliens in the instant case, their post-removal-period detention
was not arbitrary or capricious6" and was therefore permissible.61 The
instant Court, however, rejected Justice Kennedy's approach for lack of
authority.62
statutory post-removal-period detention lacked procedural safeguards. Id. at 692. Furthermore, the
instant Court rejected justifications for the statute, preventing flight of the aliens and protecting the
community from dangerous aliens, as insufficient. Id. at 690-91. The instant Court found the
statutes applicability to both visa violators and dangerous aliens, such as suspected terrorists, to be
too broad. Id. at 691.
53. Id. at 693. The instant Court made a point to note that the entry distinction "made all the
difference." Id.
54. Id. (citing Johnson, 339 U.S. at 784; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. 259,
269 (1990)).
55. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-98 & n.5 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
56. See id at 699 and supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
57. Davis, 533 U.S. at 719 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 720 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy emphasized that when an alien is ordered
removed, his ties to the community are deemed to be insufficient and his presence in the United
States is no longer justified. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He also emphasized that, "[a]n alien's
admission to this country is conditioned upon compliance with our laws, and removal is the
consequence of a breach of that understanding." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 694-95. The instant Court stated that the issue was not whether the aliens had the
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The instant Court also rejected the reading of Shaughnessy presented
by Justice Scalia,63 who wrote in a separate dissent joined by Justice
Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that the holding in Shaughnessy was not
based simply on a territorial distinction, but rather on the right asserted by
the alien in that case to be released into the United States.' Justice Scalia
equated the right claimed by the aliens in the instant case-the right to be
free from indefinite detention-to the right to be released into the United
States.65 Since there is no such right,' Justice Scalia argued that the
Constitution
allows the indefinite detention of the aliens in the instant
67
case.

The instant Court's reliance on a strict territorial distinction 8 confirms
that an alien's location is the overriding factor in determining the amount
of due process protection that the Constitution allows him. The motivation
for relying on a strict territorial distinction is unclear. Although the
distinction might appear to provide the advantage of a bright line rule,
inconsistency in its application prevents any such advantage from
materializing.69 The territorial distinction itself is not basic in a spatial
sense since it depends upon technical definitions of what locations
constitute a United States territory.70 Furthermore, the use of the territorial

distinction in Shaughnessy was coupled with non-spatial variables, such
as the duration of the alien's absence and the nature of his activities while
abroad.7"
right to remain in the United States, but rather, whether the United States may indefinitely detain
aliens it cannot remove. Id. at 695.
63. Id. at 694-95.
64. Id at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that no Justice on the Shaughnessy
Court asserted that the alien in that case had a substantive constitutional right to be released into
the United States. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he asserted that the distinction between
an alien who has effected entry and one who has not is only relevant with respect to the procedures
used to prevent the alien's entry orto expel him. Id at 703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)). But cf id.at 696 (stating that the liberty interest of an alien
is strong enough to raise serious constitutional questions about the alien's indefinite detention
regardless of the procedures used).
65. Id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see alsoLandon, 459 U.S. at 32 (finding that an alien
who seeks initial entry into the United States is requesting a privilege for which there is no
constitutional right).
67. Davis, 533 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 694.
69. The alien in Kwong Hai Chew was absent from the country for five months aboard a
merchantvessel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,594 (1953). Nevertheless, he was not
treated as an entrant alien and therefore, was afforded due process. Id. at 596. Similarly, the alien
in Landon was absent from the country for two days, but was also entitled to due process. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-50.
70. See Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 213-15 (1953).
71. The Shaughnessy Court distinguished the absence of the alien in that case by pointing to

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54

The flaw in relying on a strict territorial distinction may be most
evident in its application to future cases. For example, the instant Court
failed to distinguish Landon.72 As a result, aliens who leave the country
even for a brief period, may no longer be afforded due process protection.
To address this problem, the instant Court could have focused on the
alien's ties to the community.73 Instead of exclusively relying on the
alien's presence in the country, the instant Court could have used it as one
of several factors for measuring the strength of the alien's ties to the
American social structure.74 For instance, not only were the aliens in the
instant case present in the United States, but they lived in the United States
without interruption since they were about eight years old.75 Thus,
applying this reasoning to the instant case, it is likely that the instant Court
would have arrived at the same result.76
It is doubtful that the instant Court could have reached the same result
in the case had it given Shaughnessy the interpretation suggested by
Justice Scalia.7 7 Nor is it likely that the instant Court would have reached
the same result had it utilized the arbitrary and capricious test.7" The
government gave reasonable justification for the post-removal-period
detention,7 9 but the instant Court summarily dismissed the arbitrary and
capricious test for lack of authority."0
It is questionable, however, whether such a test was lacking in
authority any more than the instant Court's use of a strict territorial
distinction.8" Although the Shaughnessy Court emphasized that the alien
the fact that he was absent for a longer duration and stayed in a communist country without
permission from the United States. Id.
72. See Davis, 533 U.S. at 690-99.
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy also examined an alien's
compliance with the laws of the United States. See id. Compliance with the laws could be used as
evidence of an alien's ties to the United States, thereby streamlining the test. The test might,
however, lose some of the meaning Justice Kennedy intended. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,

80 (1976) (stating that in deciding whether or not to extend welfare benefits to aliens, the character
of the alien's relationship with the United States may be considered); see also supra text

accompanying notes 18, 19, 48, & 50.
74. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
75. Davis, 533 U.S. at 684-85.
76. See supranote 74; see alsoPlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,220 (1982) (holding that children
of illegal aliens are entitled to public education).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993) (stating that analysis of substantive due process rights must start with a"careful description
of the asserted right").
78. See supra note 2 & text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
79. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690-91. The instant Court dismissed flight risk and danger to the
community as insufficientjustifications but did not conclude that they were arbitrary or capricious.
See id.
80. Id. at 694-95.
81. The Shaughnessy Court acknowledged that a lawful resident alien may not be captiously
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was not within the territory of the United States, the territorial distinction
was not the sole consideration.82 Rather, it is arguable that the
Shaughnessy Court merely leveraged the territorial distinction to reach a
desired result.83 Thus, it is unclear whether the instant Court's reliance on
a strict territorial distinction to determine an alien's due process rights was
within the scope of Shaughnessy."
Regardless of the instant Court's reasoning, the aliens in the instant
case are sympathetic ones.8" It is certainly arguable that the due process
clause is meant to protect them and others similarly situated from
indefinite detention. The reasoning the instant Court used to support its
decision may, however, have unintended consequences. The message of
the instant Court is that any immigrant who breaks through the borders of
the United States will be afforded due process protection.' Not only does
the instant case undermine efforts to curb illegal immigration, 8 it may
have a grave impact on national security. A result of the instant case is that
even illegal aliens suspected of terrorist activity may not be detained.89 It
is doubtful that the instant Court would have used the same analysis had
the case been decided after the events of September 11, 2001 .
deprived of due process. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (citing Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953)).
82. See supranote 71 and accompanying text.
83. It is difficult to ignore the possibility that the effects of the Cold War had an impact on
the decision in Shaughnessy.That the Attorney General could not release information regarding
the reason for detaining the alien in that case for fear of prejudicing the public, along with
implications that the alien had possible ties to communism, illustrate this point. See supranote 26
and accompanying text; text accompanying note 33. This is further illustrated by the Court's
opposite decision about a month earlier in a case with facts similar to those in Shaughnessy.
In Kwong Hal Chew, the Court held that although the alien in that case had been absent from
the country for five months, he was entitled to an opportunity to be heard. Kwong Hai Chew, 339
U.S. at 603. The Court made an effort to emphasize the patriotic duties of the alien in Kwong Hai
Chew and noted other evidence of his devotion to America. Id at 592-94.
84. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (choosing not to determine the scope
of Shaughnessy).
85. See supratext accompanying note 75.
86. Throughout its opinion, the instant Court suggested that there is inherent unfairness in
the possibility of a permanent detention for aliens who are not accepted by any country. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001).
87. See id.at 716 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. See id.at 711 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. See id.at 713-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (stating that classification of aliens must
be determined in light of changing political and economic circumstances); see also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771-72 (1950). In Johnson, the Court stated that an alien's status is
impaired while his nation is at war with the United States. Johnson,339 U.S. at 771. The Court
bolstered this statement by pointing to "the actualities of modem... warfare" where every human
is mobilized "wherever they may be-in arms, intrigue and sabotage. . . ." Id at 772. It is not
difficult to imagine that the Court in Johnson would have included terrorism in its list had the
activity been more prevalent at the time the case was decided.
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